Even granting that a legal finding of collusion must entail an explicit agreement and explicit communication attended thereto, to Zack’s point (as I interpret it), isn’t it possible that the way in which the owners set up the 2016 CBA—i.e., with the escalation of luxury tax, related forfeitures of draft picks, etc.—might constitute a sort of collusion aforethought in strategy, without the need for subsequent agreement and communication in tactics?

IOW, is it possible the ownership cabal set up the CBA in such a way that they could not be faulted for acting in their own individual best interests, ostensibly independent of one another, while still enjoying the collusive benefits of such an agreement? And if so, wouldn’t it be the responsibility of the MLBPA for not recognizing that as the likely outcome?

And owners have literally always looked for ways not to pay players. Salary suppression and the strangling of players’ rights are baked right into the roots of organized baseball, and this is just the latest iteration. Owners have never “happily” paid anyone.

It was this community, and this website, that argued that those players weren’t worth the money and continually criticized them. Go read some BP transaction analysis from 15 years ago. There’s not very many charitable comments. We consistently called them idiots and told them that 35 year old, 10 time allstars probably weren’t worth the money because they were washed up and done by that point – and eventually, they hired the very people who ran this website to help run their teams.

And what do you know, now teams are doing that.

This argument didn’t originate with teams or ownership, and to act like it does is to be willfully ignorant of the publishing history of the brand for which you’re currently writing.

I’m Dodger fan. As an educated consumer of baseball I have no problems with their offseason conduct – they picked up a quality, needed lefthanded reliever for cheap, took a flyer on a failed starter (similar to the NRI that produced Brandon Morrow just last season), and the reality is that the players on the market are a pretty poor fit for them (they’ll get 2-2.5 wins out of Pederson, Hernandez etc in LF, the weakest point on the roster .. they could pay $15m to forcibly upgrade that position by maybe a win by signing Lorenzo Cain, and that’s probably the best fit FA on the market for them). A Darvish resigning would be nice but not really worth the money – their rotation is fine and incredibly deep, with prospects (Walker Buehler, for example) on the way.

However, if teams are smart, the system will break down because MLBPA has foolishly put all their eggs in the free agency basket. If teams will not engage in Albert Pujols or Miguel Cabrera contracts, the system stops working. Right now, players provide surplus value at a young age, letting a small market team rebuild and accumulate talent and enter a phase of being competitive (see royals, or pirates) before those players depart and the cycle continues. That system works if those players then get paid too much at the end of their careers when their value is declining.

Free agency’s entire history has more or less worked this way. Players have sold out the pre-arb and arb players for the potential of the big FA signing for their longterm members for decades, and it worked because players all dream about being a star who signs that kind of deal.

If those deals stop occuring for anyone but the transcendent talents (the Bryants, Trouts, Kershaw, Seager, Harper, etc), that system will break.

But it’s also the case that I almost certainly believe my team is objectively stronger in the long run if they don’t sign one of this year’s poorly fit, marginal-upgrade free agents so they can both resign Kershaw for a stupid amount of money and then make a run at Harper or Machado next season (to say nothing of having the cash to eventually extend Boras-Repped Corey Seager).

Its possible to critique the way the system’s breaking down without simultaneously arguing that the motivations of front offices are malign, and in fact there’s a pretty good chance that’s exactly what’s happening.

I pointed out at some length in the comment section of the Ben Diamond article you linked that BP itself has actively advocated for most of the things that are happening for a long time. When one or two teams is finding better value by being ‘smart’, it was good for those teams, but when every team is doing it, it is actively bad for the players because the teams have recognized they have more leverage.

Actual collusion involves an agrement and communication. There’s a near 0% chance of finding that among sooo many executives, many of whom these days in player development and scouting are former players or former baseball writers of left-leaning bent.

But teams are recognizing their power over free agents is much stronger than they thought, and the consistency in evaluation, the removal of many teams from the FA market in any year due to rebuilding, and the way only a few teams are good fits for each premier FA have created a situation where there’s basically no bidding to be had.

How many teams really want JD Martinez? Can you list a serious suitor besides the Red Sox? So why should the Sox be aggressive? In the end they will get what they want because their negotiating position is stronger. JD only has a stronger position of multiple teams are interested in his talents, and his horrific glovework has muted the value of his upgrade to the other (very small) list of contenders that could upgrade at a corner outfield position.

The same is true of Hosmer (what contender needs a questionably reliable, slightly better than average first baseman? Teams have Rizzo and Bellinger, and, for that matter, Yuli Gurriel who are superior or equal players). The Astros and Dodgers have more starting pitching than they have rotation spots for; the list of suitors for Darvish is in practice the Cubs and Twins.

This CBA’s structure makes it punitive to exceed certain thresholds and, more importantly, ahs made those thresholds ramp up very slowly. the average team payroll is increasing much faster than the tax line, and more importantly, than the critical Second Surtax line that costs teams as much as 93% of the overage (if they are in the 50% multiple-offender tier) and degrades their first round draft choice. That line is going to be an effective salary cap for everyone but a team in absolute win-now mode.

Alleging that the owners’ behavior is rooted in only profit motive weakens your argument. It is sufficient to argue that this change to the status quo is going to fuck the players in a very bad way and will need to be changed without ascribing rationale. Many clubs have shown that profit is far from their single motivator (look at the payrolls the Dodgers and Yankees have run before), and those teams don’t see the need to spend right now, because the thing that pressures them to spend (competition) isn’t pushing. The Dodgers are 10 games better than the next best team in their division. If they want to upgrade to get an edge on the Cubs in the next NLCS, they’ll do it at the trade deadline when they have a better idea of their needs and know who has been injured or declined in the course of the season.