Top Play (WPA): Speak of the Devil, and he shall appear. No sooner had the internet dust (also known by its common name, catnip) settled on my piece on the Cubs’ extraordinary record in one-run and extra-inning games, than the Cubs won in extras by one run. It’s nothing much more than coincidence, but it sure makes you feel good as a writer. Speaking of feeling good, I’d be willing to lay a fairly hefty wager that there are some serious good vibes coming from the Cubs’ clubhouse these days. Not only is the team nine games over .500 for the first time since 2009, they’ve done it by winning four in a row, the last two against two of the better pitchers—Clayton Kershaw and Zack Greinke—in the game. Yesterday’s win, in fact, was as good a model as any for the template the Cubs have used all season long to beat good pitchers: run up their pitch counts, and get them out of the game. Greinke pitched brilliantly, but at 111 pitches through six innings pitched, even old-school manager Don Mattingly wouldn’t let Greinke stay in for the final third of the game, and even the best bullpens are (usually) worse than a Cy Young winner pitching at the top of his game. That allowed the Cubs to load the bases with nobody out in the bottom of the tenth, paving the way for Chris Denorfia to do this:
That single play improved the Cubs’ chances of winning by 17.3 percent (that’s to 100 percent, total, in case you missed the boat entirely). We spoke of the Devil, yes, and his coming was exactly what we’d hoped for.
Bottom Play (WPA): The thing about WPA as a statistic is that it’s very context-dependent. That’s sort of the point, honestly—it totals up the importance of the situation and then awards extra credit for performing well in situations with extremely high ‘leverage,’ or potential to change the outcome of the game. This statistical feature means shining moments like Denorfia’s, above, rise to the top of the pack easily, while somewhat lesser moments occurring in similar situations shoot to the very bottom of the WPA pile. The ‘worst’ play of today’s game is in the latter category: it wasn’t bad, but it was bad enough in an important situation. One batter before Denorfia sent the Cubs to their clubhouse disco party, Addison Russell hit a sharp ground ball to Adrian Gonzalez, the Dodgers’ extraordinary first baseman, who briefly bobbled the ball but managed to fire it home, nabbing Mike Baxter and recording the first out of the inning. It wasn’t a badly hit ball by Russell at all—just right at Gonzalez—but it reduced the Cubs’ chances of winning the game by a solid 10.7 percent. That’s what you get for using a context-dependent stat.
On a somewhat interesting note, Denorfia mentioned after the game that he’d taken Russell aside before the at-bat and given him a few notes about facing Kenley Jansen, the Dodgers’ pitcher. That makes sense, on the one hand, because Denorfia had faced Jansen 12 times entering play on Tuesday; that’s more than all but seven other big-league hitters. It doesn’t really make sense, on the other, because Denorfia’s OPS against Jansen is a measly .258, which is actually the second-worst OPS against him by any hitter with more than 10 plate appearances logged standing 60 feet 6 inches away. In any event, improbability won out tonight, and Denorfia was able to look for a cutter he could hit (his words, not mine) and send the Cubs home happy.
Key Moment: There were a lot of nice moments in this game, and if I was willing to move away from the baseball side of things a little, it’d probably be appropriate to note that the play that’ll be remembered from this game a decade from now is this one, where a father holding a nursing baby snatched a foul ball, barehanded, essentially from Gonzalez’s fingertips as he raced down the first-base line. But hey, this is a baseball site, not a human-interest site, damnit, so I’ll go with another play. Just give me a moment to take off my party-pooper hat, and tell you about the play Starlin Castro made with one out in the ninth inning. Give it a watch:
This is an interesting play for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, it recorded the second out of the ninth inning of a tie game. That’s always big. Second, it was no doubt a confidence booster for a shortstop who’s come under severe criticism—some of it, I admit, from me—on his defense. But thirdly, and most interestingly, it was a play where Castro was forced to make a decision on the fly about whether to make the risky play (a barehand) or not, and chose not to. To me, that’s a good sign. Castro’s mental problems have always come when he tries to do to much, and if he can do things like this play more often—where he actively chooses to take the low-risk play, things will start going right in a hurry for the 25 year-old.
Trends to Watch: Well, there’s a lot of trends here. That’s the nature of baseball. If I were in a more self-indulgent mood, I’d tell you to drop everything right here and go read my piece on the Cubs’ record in one-run and extra-inning games, but hey, you’ve already been told about it and had that opportunity. It would be the height of silliness to link to it a third time. Given that, it’s probably better to talk about something different, like the fact that the Cubs have won by beating two aces in a row. This plays into something which I’ve noticed anecdotally over the last few months, and which I’ll be digging into in great detail shortly: the Cubs seem to be able to rise to the level of their opposition particularly well. It’s been true these last two days, and it was true in early May when the Cubs took all four of a four-game set against the Mets with their aces on the mound. But it worries me a little. Playing up to level is indisputably a good thing, but these Cubs have also shown a tendency to play down to bad opponents as well. I’ll save you the horror of quoting the team’s record against the Brewers this year. With a second-half schedule that’s light on big-league heavyweights, it’ll be important for the team to find a way to keep up the intensity as they make their push down the stretch.
Coming Next: Speaking of keeping up the intensity, the boys in blue will have a chance to practice just that skill tonight as they leave Cy Young Row behind and face a more anonymous Dodgers’ hurler in Mike Bolsinger. Don’t be fooled by the lack of pedigree, though: Bolsinger has been pretty damn good this year, to the tune of a 2.87 ERA that’s actually been almost entirely deserved (3.09 DRA). The Cubs, meanwhile, will counter with Kyle Hendricks, who’s actually been quite a bit better (4.28 ERA) than his 4.96 DRA indicates he deserves to be. That’s what you get for being able to locate merely second-tier stuff most of the time. Looking past the Dodgers series a little bit, the Cubs will finish up at Wrigley on Thursday afternoon and head southwest to St. Louis, there to take on the Cardinals in a three-game set. That team, despite losing everyone except their clubhouse guy to injury and various, ahem, off-field distractions, just keeps finding ways to win. With a 4-3 victory over the Marlins last night, they moved their record to an amazing 46-24, which is the best record in baseball and a whole 6.5 games ahead of the Cubs, who nonetheless sport the fifth-best record in the majors. Oy. Onwards.
Lead photo courtesy Caylor Arnold-USA TODAY Sports
Long time reader who loves this site, first time commenter.
What is your analysis on Maddon choosing to have Fowler not bunt in the 10th with 2 on, 0 out? Statistically, advancing the runners to play for a single run makes the most sense, but I liked the move to have him not bunt because of Russell’s proclivity to strike out.
Great to hear from you! From what I gathered from Maddon’s postgame comments, the decision not to bunt was largely about his knowledge of Peralta’s fly-ball tendencies. He’s managed him before, and figured that there was a relatively low risk of a double-play ball, and that the marginal ability of the runner on second to score was only somewhat lower than that of a runner on third. He’d rather have the out, in that situation.
I don’t think, in other words, that it represents a deep-seated aversion to bunts. We’ve already seen Maddon go that route, a few times, in fact. What it does represent, I think, is a real respect for matchup numbers. Time and time again, Maddon has gone to his matchup splits for guidance on gametime decisions. That’s what this was.