The following transaction analysis, written in part by BP Wrigleyville’s Editor-in-Chief Rian Watt, first appeared, in whole, over at the main site. We trust you’ll enjoy reading a portion of it here.
“How can one evaluate such an idiosyncratic president, so brilliant and so morally lacking?” — Historian James MacGregor Burns, on Richard Nixon
Aroldis Chapman is not Richard Nixon. For one thing, Nixon was a righty. For another, in Chapman’s dossier is a far lesser—if still deeply and painfully suggestive—body of evidence that the man in question is, in MacGregor’s words, “morally lacking.” But both men, it is clear, did or have done much in life worth apologizing for, and both men, it is equally clear, were—and, in Chapman’s case, will very likely remain for some time—unambiguously brilliant performers in their chosen fields. In the jarring collision of those paired truths lies the essential tension of this trade, and also the enormous difficulty of producing an analysis of its merits. The standard rules simply do not apply.
Let’s begin simply, by pretending that they do. Today, the Cubs have Aroldis Chapman, and not Clayton Richard, on their big-league roster. Yesterday, in contrast, they had Clayton Richard, and not Aroldis Chapman, on their big-league roster. You need know little of the particulars of each man’s season to date to understand that this means that the Cubs are a better team today than they were yesterday. You need know only slightly more—for example, that the Cubs can now throw Pedro Strop out for the seventh inning, and Hector Rondon for the eighth—to understand that they’re probably also a team better prepared to win postseason games today than they were yesterday, although the degree to which elite relieving contributes to postseason success is a far more contested subject than the superiority of Aroldis Chapman to Clayton Richard.
So, the Cubs are a better team today than they were yesterday. That is a feature of their present state of affairs. But they are also a team today without the services, either at present or in the future, of Adam Warren, Gleyber Torres, Billy McKinney, and Rashad Crawford. That is also a feature of their present state of affairs. Is that present state a better or worse one for the Cubs than the state they’d have been in had they done nothing at all yesterday? And the fact is, there is no single correct answer to that question. The conclusion you come to will depend almost entirely upon the degree to which you value Cubs wins in the present–especially wins in the postseason–over Cubs wins in the future–especially wins in the regular season–and the degree to which you believe that any of the players sent to the Yankees could have contributed to either category.
To read the rest of this story, please head on over to the main site.
Lead photo courtesy Adam Hunger—USA Today Sports.
Rian, I read your full writeup on the BP mothership, and I am honestly conflicted about the whole thing. A lot of it is from a baseball sense, I really liked the idea of Torres in the system, but I definitely see the need for an impact arm in the bullpen. So why Chapman? Well, he’s the best available.
I recall reading a sports column a few years ago that laid out a well thought out conclusion that we root for colors. Loyalty to player and team is fleeting, so while we might fondly remember Ryan Sandberg wearing Cubbie blue we also want to forget (or many but not all want to forget) that Sosa wore the same uniform. Now we have Chapman. He has been “punished,” or at least he’s allowed to play baseball again, so given his talent someone is going to employ him. The Yankees were first, now the Cubs, and starting next year he’ll be in for $30+ mil guaranteed. Whatever.
I root for Cubbie blue. May they win the WS.